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TAX PARAMETERS IN THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY:
PART I – INDIRECT TAXES*
Alfredo Marvão Pereira**
Pedro Rodrigues***
In the first of two twin papers, we focus on indirect taxes and formally discuss the cor-
respondences between statutory and effective tax rates in the Portuguese economy. These
correspondences depend on the details of the Portuguese tax law, on a wealth of data infor-
mation, and on certain priors about the values of behavioural parameters in the economy.
For each of the different tax margins, we choose a specification of the tax base that is stan-
dard in tax policy evaluation exercises, albeit necessarily only an approximation to the
true tax base. In addition to the general correspondences, we present our own estimates of
the effective tax rates at the different tax margins. More importantly, however, using the
information in this paper, practitioners of tax policy evaluation can obtain their own esti-
mates of the relevant tax parameters.
1. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this series of two papers is to
establish the mapping between statutory and ef-
fective tax rates in the Portuguese economy. Ulti-
mately, we address the question of how changes in
statutory tax rates induce changes in effective tax
rates. This is a critical question from the perspec-
tive of tax policy evaluation.
From time to time, the topic of tax reform
re-enters the political arena. Tax reform proposals
are invariably phrased in terms of changes in the
statutory tax rates (see, for example, Cavaco Silva
(1999), where the former Portuguese Prime Minis-
ter presents a comprehensive tax reform package
for Portugal). This is understandable since statu-
tory tax rates are under the direct jurisdiction of
the legislative powers. Furthermore, statutory tax
rates are easily available and readily understood
by the general public.
From the standpoint of the practitioner of tax
policy evaluation, the formulation of tax reform
proposals in terms of statutory tax rates presents
several challenges. In general terms this is be-
cause, from the perspective of tax policy evalua-
tion, statutory tax rates are close to irrelevant (see,
for example, Primarolo (2000), where the Paymas-
ter General of the UK’s Treasury addresses this
point in the context of tax harmonization in the
EU).
In fact, for the economic analysis of the incen-
tives to work, consume, save and invest that are
induced by the tax code what matters most is eco-
nomic behaviour at the margin. As such, ideally,
the proposed tax rate changes should be framed in
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however, are notoriously difficult to obtain. There-
fore, an approximation that is often used in tax
policy evaluation is the effective tax rate.
The relationship between statutory and effec-
tive tax rates is a rather complex matter. It de-
pends, first and foremost, on the details of the tax
law, which was clearly not written by nor for
economists or policy analysts. It also depends on
behavioural parameters for the economy that are
often difficult to identify and that, at any rate, re-
flect the priors of the tax policy analyst. Further-
more, it depends on data information which is ei-
ther not available or comes from varied and not
necessarily compatible sources.
The effective tax rate, , can be defined simply
as the ratio between total tax revenues, T, and the





Observed tax revenues, however, are the result
of a myriad of tax rules. In reality, statutory tax
rates, t, along with deductions, D, and tax credits,
CR, are the instruments of tax legislation. A highly
stylised description of how these three variables
come together to determine tax revenues, in gen-
eral, is
Tt BDC R   ().
Note that only when there are no credits and no
deductions are effective and statutory tax rates
equal, i.e., t.
In this highly simplified framework, changes in







Notice how this mapping is independent of the
existence of credits. The effective tax rate, how-
ever, is not, i.e.,  CR0. Note also that, if there
are no deductions but credits are non-zero, then
the correspondence is one-to-one, even though ef-






In addressing the relationship between the stat-
utory tax rate and the effective tax rate from the
perspective of tax policy evaluation there is an ad-
ditional complication. Both the use of analytical
instruments and the level of aggregation at which
the analysis is done require a degree of abstraction
and generalization, which would not be present in
a framework of individual tax accounting. This
means that many of the finer details of the tax law
have to be ignored as the true tax base is approxi-
mated using aggregate macroeconomic data. This
approach is well suited for mainstream tax policy
analysis along the lines of, for example, Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1984, 1987), Ballard, Fullerton,
Shoven and Whalley (1985), Bovenberg (1986),
Fullerton and Gordon (1983), Goulder and Sum-
mers (1989), Goulder and Thalman (1993),
Kotlikoff (1995), Pereira (1994, 1999) and Shoven
and Whalley (1984).
Finally, a word about data information and
data sources. In the computation of the effective
tax rate, every attempt was made to use all avail-
able information from 1990 to 1998. By using this
time frame, we guarantee the use of the most re-
cent tax data available. By using averages for this
period, we attempt to capture long-term trends in
the economy and thereby avoid business cycle ef-
fects and the effects of any other spurious eco-
nomic events. Also, in the computation of the ef-
fective tax rate, it was inevitable to use data from
different sources. This posed some compatibility
problems between national account and public ac-
count data. As a quintessential example of this,
there is no readily available data, on a national ac-
count basis, for tax revenues at the different tax
margins we consider. Such a disaggregation only
seems to exist on a public account basis. As such,
the strategy we follow consists in using national
account data (INE Contas Nacionais, several issues,
and DGEFA, 1999) for the aggregates, and then us-
ing public account data (DGEP, 1999) to approxi-
mate the shares of each of the tax margins in total
revenues.
In the first of a two part series, we focus on in-
direct taxes and we explore the relationship be-
tween statutory and effective tax rates at the most
significant indirect tax margins in the Portuguese
economy (Pereira and Rodrigues (2001) focuses on
direct taxes). Indeed, value-added and excise taxes
are considered in great detail. We present several
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correspondences between statutory and effective
tax rates at the different margins. We highlight not
only the mathematical mapping but also the data
information and the economic parameters neces-
sary to establish such mappings. As such, the ac-
companying text is essentially a guided tour of the
different tables complemented with a detailed ref-
erence to sources. For a comprehensive descrip-
tion of the Portuguese tax system, in legal terms,
the reader is referred to CEF (1997) and KPMG
(1997).
2. VALUE-ADDED AND EXCISE TAXES
2.1. General aspects
In Portugal, from 1990 to 1998, we estimate that
value-added and excise tax revenues averaged
14.2% of GDP evaluated at market prices.
Under the Portuguese tax legislation (CIVA),
the value-added tax (VAT, hereafter) is designated
imposto sobre o valor acrescentado. All goods and ser-
vices marketed and sold, whether produced do-
mestically or imported, are liable to VAT as long
as they are purchased for use within Portuguese
territory. This implies that exports are, in effect,
exempt from VAT.
In general terms, VAT is a tax on the purchase
of final goods, and follows the general pattern of
value-added taxes in most European countries. Be-
ing a value-added tax means that only the value
that is added through an entrepreneurial activity
to the inputs acquired is liable to this tax. Through
a chain method, sellers then collect VAT on the
value of the good or service sold, deduct the VAT
they paid on their inputs and hand over the differ-
ence to the Treasury. It follows that, while the
seller is the one that is held accountable to the
Treasury for the VAT revenues, the incidence gen-
erally lies with the economic agents that purchase
these final goods. This is because these goods and
services will not be resold or incorporated in a
new good or service that will be placed on the
market and, as such, no VAT rebate is due on
these purchases.
In addition to the VAT, the Portuguese tax sys-
tem considers excise taxes, i.e., special indirect
taxes levied on the consumption of specific goods.
That is the case of alcohol and alcoholic beverages
(imposto sobre bebidas alcoólicas e sobre o álcool or
IBAA), on the purchase of new automobiles (im-
posto automóvel or IA), on petroleum products (im-
posto sobre produtos petrolíferos or ISP), and finally,
on tobacco (imposto sobre o tabaco or IST).
In practice, VAT is levied ad valorem as the last
surcharge, i.e., the tax base is the total amount (in-
cluding other taxes) that would be charged to a
buyer if no VAT existed. As an example, for im-
ported goods and services this would include im-
port duties, where applicable. Moreover, goods
that are subject to excise taxes are liable to VAT on
an already engrossed tax base. These are two in-
stances of double taxation in the Portuguese tax
code (see Pereira and Rodrigues (2001) for other
cases).
In addition to households, firms and the public
sector also purchase goods and services that are li-
able to VAT and, in some cases, to excise taxes.
Accordingly, we disaggregate total value-added
and excise tax revenues, TVATET, by five macroeco-
nomic aggregates - private consumption, C, public
consumption, CG, private investment, I, public in-
vestment in infrastructure and in transportation
equipment, IG, and public investment in educa-
tion, IH. That is,
TT T T T T VATET VATET C VATET CG VATET I VATET IG VATE    ,, , , TI H ,.
2.2. Value-added and excise taxes on private
consumption spending
We estimate that VAT and excise tax revenues
derived from private consumption expenditure ac-
tivities,TVATET C , , totalled 11.416% of GDP evaluated
at market prices for the 1990-1998 period.
In Portugal, households consume a wide vari-
ety of goods and services, many of which are
taxed at different rates. This is for two reasons.
First, as referred to above, alcoholic beverages, pe-
troleum products(1), automobiles and tobacco are
all liable to specific excise taxes. Second, different
categories of goods are effectively subject to differ-
ent VAT rates.
The general VAT rate, which we denote by
tVAT,5, is 17%. The tax code considers another four
Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / March 2001 47
Articles
(1) Even though all petroleum products are subject to some form
of excise taxes, we focus only on unleaded gasoline. Hence-
forth, we use gasoline and petrol interchangeably.48 Banco de Portugal / Economic bulletin / March 2001
Articles
Table 1
VALUE-ADDED AND EXCISE TAXES ON PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
In statutory terms
T t ttt VATET C VAT HH VAT HH VAT HH V ,, , , , , ,
~~~  1 1 22 33  	 	 
 AT HH VAT alcohol HH alcohol VAT tt ,, , , ,
~~
44 5 5 11     .
	    tobacco HH tobacco VAT autos HH autos V tt ~~
,, ,   11 5 	 AT petrol HH petrol VAT t ,, ,
~
55   .
~~~ ~ ~
,,, ,   HH alcohol HH tobacco HH autos HH petrol    	 	 HH rest
MP
VATET C .C T ,. ,  (1)
In effective terms
TC VATET C VATET C
FC
,,  (2)
	 	  alcohol alcohol VAT HH alcohol
MP
VAT ETR t C t    11 55 ,, , 
 ETRalcohol (3)
	 	  tobacco tobacco VAT HH tobacco
MP
VAT ETR t C t    11 55 ,, , 
 ETRtobacco (4)
	   autos autos VAT HH autos
MP
Firms autos





VAT autos CG t ETR    ,, 1 5 (5)
	   petrol petrol VAT HH petrol
MP





VAT petrol IC G t E T R    ,, 1 5 (6)













1   	 	 H petrol petrol HH alcohol alcohol HH toba ,, ,
~~ 11     	 cco tobacco 1
(7)
Data
TY C Y T Y VATET
MP MP MP
VATET C
MP   0 142 0 649 0 11416 .,., . , ,









~ ., ~ ., ~ ., ~
,,,   HH HH HH HH  0 08740 0 17595 0 02364 234 0 11086 0 44924  ., ~ . ,. HH rest
~ ., ~ ., ~
,, ,   HH alcohol HH autos HH petro  0 01239 0 10436 l HH tobacco  0 02735 0 00687 ., ~ . , 
See Table 2 for an average household’s nominal budget shares.
The calculated effective tax rate
VATET C , . 0 21345
See Table 2 for the different effective tax rates for the several categories.










Sources: DGEP (1999), INE (1997), INE Contas Nacionais Authors’ calculations.expenditure categories that benefit from progres-
sively lower value-added tax rates, i.e.,
tt VAT VAT ,, 54  ttt VAT VAT VAT ,,, 321  . In what fol-
lows, we detail the composition of these four addi-
tional expenditure categories.
Category 4 encompasses goods like oils, fats,
coffee, tea, cocoa, mineral waters, and restaurant
tabs that are subject to a rate of tVAT, % 4 12  . Also
included in this category are general expenditures
from Azores and Madeira on goods and services
which, if sold on the continent, would pay the
general VAT rate, tVAT,5 but which enjoy a reduced
rate of 12% in these regions. Category 3 is created
to accommodate the fact that certain fish, meat,
milk and dairy products pay a reduced rate of 5%.
Similar products, however, like yoghurts pay 12%,
and shellfish pay the general rate of 17%. We as-
sume that the applicable rate for this category is
tVAT, % 3 6  . In turn, Category 2 is made up of
goods and services like fruit, vegetables, grain, po-
tatoes, water, electricity, public transportation,
medicine, hotels and cultural shows that pay
tVAT, % 2 5  . Finally, goods belonging to category 1
pay the lowest VAT rate, Essentially, these are the
goods and services that, if sold on the continent,
would be liable to a value-added tax rate of tVAT,2.
This suggests that the islands of Açores and Ma-
deira enjoy yet another special regime.
To proceed, we need to know the fraction of a
representative household’s budget that is spent on
each of nine expenditure categories — five for
VAT rates and four for goods subject to excise
taxes in addition to the VAT. To retrieve these
budget shares, we resort to INE (1997), a 1994
household budget survey, and adjust the informa-
tion therein to account for business cycle effects,
since 1994 was a year of recession. Essentially, we
have increased the shares of automobiles, gasoline
and tobacco at the expense of foodstuffs. There-
fore, the adjusted budget shares, HH, , 1 HH, , 2
HH, , 3 HH, , 4 HH alcohol , , HH petrol , , HH tobacco , , and HH rest ,. ,
presented as column five in Table 2 reflect our pri-
ors based on the available published information
as to the fraction of household consumption ex-
penditure valued at market prices, C
MP, that is al-
located to each expenditure category.
The information that we have obtained on bud-
get shares, naturally, is defined in terms of market
prices. These market prices include, in addition to
the factor cost, the excise tax and the VAT pay-
ments. This introduces the difference between con-
sumption spending at market prices, C
MP, and at
factor cost, C
FC, or net of tax payments. Dividing a
macroeconomic variable, X, evaluated at market
prices, X
MP, by the corresponding effective value-
added and excise tax rate, 1 VATET X , , we obtain
the variable evaluated at factor cost,X
FC(2).
To pursue the calculation of effective tax rates
per expenditure category, we need to transform
the budget shares, at market prices, into real bud-
get shares at factor cost. For alcoholic beverages,
for example, the consumer pays an amount of
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Table 2
TAX PARAMETERS RELATED TO THE TAXATION OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION
Category j  j tVAT j , Budget shares
in 1994 (INE)
HH j , VATET j ,
( 1 ).................. - 4 % 0.07491 0.07491 4.000%
( 2 ).................. - 5 % 0.16225 0.15225 5.000%
( 3 ).................. - 6 % 0.02065 0.02065 6.000%
( 4 ).................. - 1 2 % 0.13178 0.10232 12.000%
(Alcohol)............. 23.999% 17% 0.01481 0.01481 45.079%
(Autos).............. 12.214% 17% 0.07291 0.11291 31.290%
(Petrol).............. 161.713% 17% 0.02855 0.06900 206.204%
(Tobacco)............ 201.795% 17% 0.01099 0.02000 353.100%
(Rest)............... - 1 7 % 0.48315 0.43315 17.000%
Sources: DGEP (1999), INE (1997), INE Contas Nacionais, Authors’ calculations.
(2) Note that here we have ignored the subsidies component of the
market price value, and thus we somewhat underestimate the
true value of the factor cost variableHH alcohol
MP C , , which includes both kinds of taxes,
but only consumes the equivalent to ~   HH alcohol
FC C ,
where ~
. HH alcohol is the share of real consumption,
C
FC, that is allocated to alcohol.
Furthermore, note that if a household pur-
chases a good valued at x, that is subject to an ex-
cise tax at an effective rate of  and a statutory
value-added tax rate of t, then the total amount
paid will be 	 	 11  tx  , which will include
	 
 tx  1  in consumption taxes. This suggests
that we define the effective value-added and ex-
cise tax rate as is computed by deflating the re-
spective total expenditure, valued at market
prices, as 	  VATET tt   1 . Thus, total con-
sumption expenditure, evaluated at factor cost,
C
FC, is computed by deflating the respective total
expenditure, valued at market prices, C
MP,b y
1 VATET C , the effective value-added and excise tax
rate levied on total consumption expenditure.
Using alcoholic beverages as an example again,
with an effective excise tax of alcohol and a general
VAT rate of tVAT,5, nominal and real budget shares

















5 VATET C ,
.
This formula suggests that one can easily deter-
mine the real budget share for any expenditure

















The only missing information we still need, re-
lates to the effective excise tax rates, the calculation
of which we turn to next. Appealing to the defini-
tion of the effective tax rate, and using the alco-
holic beverages expenditure category as an exam-
ple once more, the effective excise tax rate, alcohol,
that is levied on the real consumption of alcohol,
~   HH alcohol
FC C , can easily be computed as the ratio be-
tween excise tax revenues, ETR, and the relevant











Note, however, that because the real budget
share depends on the effective excise tax rate, i.e.,
	 ~
,  HH alcohol alcohol , to determine a value for alcohol, one
must factor out this variable from the above equal-
ity. This yields equation (3) in Table 1.
For the remaining three kinds of goods that are
subject to excise taxes — petroleum products, au-
tomobiles, and tobacco — the effective excise tax
rates, petrol , autos and tobacco, respectively, are easily
determined using the same procedure. Data on ex-
cise tax revenues refer to 1995 and were taken
from INE, Contas Nacionais. Note, however, that
while we assume that tobacco and alcoholic bever-
ages are only consumed by households, gasoline
and new automobiles are also purchased by firms
and by the public sector. This fact suggests that, to
calculate autos and petrol, the relevant tax bases
must include the economy-wide purchases of each
















There is a wide selection of statutory tax rates
to choose from when establishing the relationship
between changes in statutory and effective tax
rates. For illustration purposes, and because it is
the most significant indirect tax margin, we choose
to determine how a change in the general VAT
rate, tVAT,5, would induce changes upon the effec-
tive value-added and excise tax rate collected on
private consumption purchases. The relevant par-
tial derivative,   VATET C VAT t ,, 5 , is equation (7) in
Table 2.
In obtaining this effect, it should be noted that
the real budget shares, and the effective excise tax
rates, j, are considered known primitives that do
not vary when the general statutory value-added
tax rate changes. Furthermore, it is assumed that
whatever changes occur in tax rates at the statu-
tory level, the composition of a representative
household’s consumption bundle, in terms of the
nine different expenditure categories, remains un-
changed. This means that a change in the statutory
tax rate only imparts changes to aggregate con-
sumption through the effect it has upon the effec-
tive tax rate. To us, this top-down approach seems
the most relevant when evaluating alternative tax
policies at an aggregate level.
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Table 3
VALUE-ADDED AND EXCISE TAXES ON OTHER SPENDING
In statutory terms
	 TI T t VATET I
MP
VATET I VAT I Firms autos Fir ,, , , [ ~~    5   	 	 ms petrol Firms autos VAT autos t ,,,
~   1 5 (8)
	  ~ ] ,,  Firms petrol VAT petrol t 1 5







MP VATET C ,,
,
,    11  	  	 




   . ~
,, , 55 1 
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P ,, ., .,  07269 0 3535
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MP IH
, . 0 90252.3. Value-added and excise taxes on other spending
activities
We estimate that VAT and excise tax revenues
derived from private investment spending activi-
ties, TVATET I , , averaged 1.841% of GDP at market
prices for the 1990-1998 period.
We assume that all private investment expendi-
tures, with the exception of automobiles,
~
, Firms autos
FC I , petroleum products, ~
, Firms petrol
FC I , and
building or infrastructure investment, I
FC I
(AECOPS, 1996), are exempt from value-added tax
(see equation 8 in Table 3). In addition, banks and
insurance firms cannot deduct any of the VAT
paid on their inputs. Clearly, the classification of
petroleum products as private investment could
be questioned. We use this approach because it is a
particularly convenient way of capturing how an
increase in the price of fuel affects production
costs.
In turn, we estimate that value-added and ex-
cise tax revenues derived from public consump-
tion, TVATET CG , , public investment in infrastructure
and automobiles, TVATET IG , , and public investment
in education, TVATET IH , , averaged 0.471%, 0.380%
and 0.092% of GDP at market prices respectively,
for the period 1990-1998.
Looking at equation (9) in Table 3, we see that
public consumption expenditures can be decom-
posed into three categories — public sector wages
(excluding wages related to public investment and
investment in education activities), petroleum
products, and all the rest. The budget shares for
these categories were taken from INE, Contas Na-
cionais and DGCP (1997).
Wage expenditure is distinct from the remain-
ing outlays in that it is exempt from value-added
and other indirect taxes. Data on public sector
wages, decomposed by economic activity,
WagesPSCG , , WagesPS IG , andWagesPS IH . , were obtained
residually after plugging in all the known parame-
ters in equations (9-11) of Table 3. These values are
broadly in line with those of INE, Contas Nacionais.
Consideration of other public spending catego-
ries is justified by different excise taxes inciding on
such expenditures. These imply differentiated ef-
fective tax rates by expenditure category. In terms
of public investment in infrastructure and automo-
biles, and public investment in education, all
non-wage related expenditures are assumed to be
subject to the general value-added tax rate. Note
that, in addition to tVAT,5public spending on new
automobiles is surcharged with an excise tax at the
effective rate of autos.
The mappings between changes in statutory
and in effective tax rates are easily determined and
result in equations (16-19) in Table 3. To obtain the
effective value-added and excise tax on private in-
vestment spending, for example, all one must do is
equalize expressions (8) and (12), equations for the
calculation of total tax revenues in statutory and
effective terms respectively. Note that, in calculat-
ing the differential effects, we assume that
Wages CG PSCG
FC
, / , WagesPS IG
FC IG , / and
Wages IH PS IH
FC
, / remain invariant to changes in
tVAT,5.
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Parameters
~ ., ~ ., ~
,, ,  PS autos PS petrol Firms autos  0 0909 0 0074  0 0570 0 0081 ., ~ . , Firms petrol
The calculated effective tax rates
  VATET I VATET CG VATET IG ,, , ., ., .  0 09365 0 04431 0 11111 0 01438 ,. , VATET IH 




























0 61396 0 084  54
Sources: AECOPS (1996), DGCP (1997), DGEP (1999), Authors’ calculations.3. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, we focus on indirect taxes and we
formally discuss the correspondences between
statutory and effective tax rates in the Portuguese
economy. Value-added and other indirect taxes
are considered in great detail. The correspon-
dences between statutory and effective tax rates
depend on the details of the Portuguese tax law
and on a wealth of data information, as well as on
certain priors about the values of behavioural pa-
rameters in the economy. In addition to the gen-
eral correspondences between statutory and effec-
tive tax rates, we present our own estimates of the
effective tax rates at the different tax margins. In
doing so, a detailed tax information was organized
in a systematic way that is particularly useful for
tax policy evaluation and the main characteristics
of the Portuguese tax system, if not all its account-
ing details, were sketched and parameterised.
The information in this paper was recently put
to good use by Pereira and Rodrigues (2000a,
2000b), in the context of an ongoing research pro-
ject on tax reform in Portugal. More importantly,
however, using the technical information in this
paper, practitioners of tax policy evaluation can
obtain estimates of the relevant tax parameters to
be used in their own work.
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